ZEPPELIN RAID - 1916

Much has been written about London and the German air raids of World War II. The city also underwent aerial bombardment on a smaller - but still deadly - scale during the First World War, testing the resources of the fire bridage.

Aero Conservancy - a virtual aviation museum - provided details of a German air raid on London. Quoting Douglas Robertson's ``The Zeppelin in Combat," Aero Conservacy said 13 airships steered toward their target on the night of Aug. 24, 1916:

(The German commander) Mathy followed the Thames straight up to London. For the first time in almost a year the inner defenses were tested, and apparently they were caught napping. The searchlights were much hampered by clouds and mist, which Mathy cleverly utilized as cover during his attack. At 1:30 a.m. he began bombing the south-eastern districts (his report says, “All bombs struck blocks of houses in south-western London and the western part of the City”), and was not found by the searchlights until five minutes later, when 120 rounds were fired at the Zeppelin as she was retreating into a cloud bank.

Though the damage caused by this swift assault was exceeded only by that in Mathy’s record raid of September 8-9, 1915, it is the worst documented of any of the Zeppelin attacks on London. It seems difficult to account for the damage toll, for aside from a hit on a power station in Deptford, it appears that private homes were the chief sufferers from Mathy’s 36 explosive and 8 incendiary bombs. The casualties were few: nine killed and forty wounded."

The fire brigade was busy, according to Aero Conservancy:

The London Fire Brigade were called to Dickson Road at 2.11 am on Friday 25 August 1916 and found damage caused by explosive bombs (as opposed to incendiary bombs which were dropped elsewhere along the Zepp's route). Damage to No's 22 to 38 Dickson Rd was confined to "roofs and window glass damaged by breakage."

Similar damage affected No's 31 to 51. Worse occurred at No 33 - privately owned by J.Horrocks - "house of six rooms and contents severely damaged by explosion" and No's 4 to 20 - houses of six rooms and contents severely damaged by explosion and about 30 x 4 ft of wood fencing damaged by fire."

The only casualties in the road occurred at No's 5 to 27 - "houses of six rooms and contents severely damaged by explosion" where 3 males (aged 23, 24 & 8) and 4 females (aged 22, 20, 17 and 53) were injured, only the 53 year old apparently being taken to hospital. All the houses, except No 33, were let out in tenements. Generally damage also to the roadway, a gas main was broken and a tree damaged by fire.

A very busy night for the Brigade during which 6 firemen received commendations for saving 6 lives at Bostal Hill, Plumstead and 4 firemen received commendations for saving 1 life at South Vale, Blackheath.

Other raids

The web site of the Euston fire station - complied by retired Station Officer Mick Pinchen - tells of other zeppelin attacks, including a raid that claimed the life of a London firefighter and another that damaged the King's Cross railroad station:

From May 1915 air raids were carried out on London by German Zeppelins, augmented in 1917 by Gotha bombers. During one such raid damaged was sustained to Kings Cross railway station and ironically the German Gymnasium in Cheney Road. Another raid, on Holborn's ground, involved Euston firemen tackling a major blaze in Lambs Conduit Passage, during which Fm Green, (Holborn), lost his life attempting to save life. He was subsequently awarded the Silver Medal.

The web site for the Euston fire station also noted:

To conform with the wartime lighting restrictions the distinctive 'Red Lamps' that adorned the outside of fire stations were removed, and, were never reinstated.

CRYSTAL PALACE - 1936

By Vinny Del Giudice
London Fire Journal

Sir Winston Churchill called it the ``end of an era.'' A spectacular fire destroyed London's famed Crystal Palace - considered the world's first modern theme park - on the night of Nov. 30, 1936.

The iron-and-glass behemoth was built in 1854 in Upper Norwood as successor to an exhibition hall erected in Hyde Park. It consisted of 900,000 square feet of glass.

News of the disaster sped around the world.

The next morning, The New York Times reported on its front page:

LONDON, Nov. 30 - Engulfed in a roaring sheet of flames, which towered so high into the night sky that it could be seen almost from the English Channel, the world-famous Crystal Palace, architectural pride of the Victorian era, crashed to the earth tonight a raging inferno of twisted girders and molten glass.

Coincidentally, New York's own Crystal Palace met a similar fate in 1857.

Sounding the alarm

A man named Henry Buckland and his daughter Crystal, named for the London palace, were walking their dog when they noticed a small fire and sounded the alarm.

The flames spread swiftly, engulfing the structure - and prompting London Fire Brigade commanders to summon a total of 88 fire engines and 438 firefighters, including some from neighboring cities, according to the BBC.

``Within hours, fire consumed all that had stood for a mighty empire and boundless imagination,'' according to Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia.

The New York Times said the battle was lost from the start:

Within a half hour, the great arcade of glass, towering 175 feet, collapsed, sending up showers of sparks and blazing embers. Then as if drawn by a flue the flames swept the whole length of the nave.

The first fire alarm must have been turned in soon after the blaze was discovered, for neighboring fire brigades arrived before the flames had begun to reach their fury. But efforts to check the spread were futile, as were those of London's most powerful fire-fighting forces, which were quickly notified and sped over all bridges leading to the south bank of the Thames.

Within three hours after the outbreak, the celebrated show place, known to millions in three generations, lay a smoldering, charred ruins.Several firefighters suffered injuries fighting the fire, the cause of which was most likely accidental.

Great crowds

Thousands gathered for a close view of the blaze.

More than 700 police officers tried to control the crowd.

The New York Times reported:

While police worked desperately to clear residents of dwellings within a radius of a mile, more thousands gathered on rooftops and other points of vantage. Members of Parliament watched from the windows of committee rooms and from terraces.

A member of the royal family, the Duke of Kent, donned firefighter turnout gear to visit the fire lines, according to Neil Wallington's book ``Great Fires of London.'' (British firefighters call their turnout gear their ``kit.'')

During World War II, the 20-acre site was used as a dump for rubble from the German air bombardments, according to the London Development Agency.

Today, a London soccer (football) team takes its name from Crystal Palace.

SMITHFIELD MARKET - 1958

Photo: Fire Brigades Union

Photo: Private collection

Photo: Private collection

Photo: London Fire Brigade

"It was very cold down there and you were cold, even though you were sweating. That was fear."

By Vinny Del Giudice
London Fire Journal

A tragic fire at London's central market prompted the fire brigade to alter its policy on firefighter breathing apparatus and replace oxygen sets with compressed air breathing apparatus.

The blaze at Union Cold Storage Co. at Smithfield Market broke out on Jan. 23, 1958 and burned for three days, starting in a labryinth of meat lockers lined with flammable insulation - cork affixed by tar. The meat, fat and grease no doubt provided ample fuel. Flames eventually gutted the market floor and toppled the roof.

The magazine Fire Engineering said:

"The underground snail-like progress of the firemen operating in the smoke and heat-charged tunnels took heavy toll of personnel. Man after man was dragged to the outer air, the most seriously affected given oxygen, after which some returned to duty—and some went to hospitals—30 of them to nearby St. Bartholomew’s for treatment. About 800 cylinders of oxygen were used during the first day."

Sadly, Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells and Firefighter Dick Stocking from the Clerkenwell Fire Station, both wearing old-style ``Proto'' apparatus, died in the cold storage lockers in the early stages of the battle, which was ultimately waged by 1,700 firefighters and 389 appliances. About two dozen firefighters were injured at ``Smithfield's."

The United Press news agency, in a dispatch published the next day in The New York Times, reported that ``the fire spread through two and a half acres of underground passages.''

According to the web site Emergency Services Centre:

"When the first pumps arrived, thick acrid smoke was pouring out of the market's maze of underground tunnels leading to cold storage rooms. One of the first crews to enter in Proto breathing apparatus sets was that from the local station, Clerkenwell. A Station Officer and a fireman headed down into the dense smoke, never to be seen alive again. Soon after their entry into the basement, they were buried under a collapse of frozen meat packets and although only yards from an exit and fresh air, their oxygen eventually ran out."

A firefighter who knew Fort-Wells described him as ``one of the old `smoke eaters'" who ``would not give up'' hunting for the seat of a fire.

In the aftermath of fires at Covent Garden Market in 1949 and 1954, the London Fire Brigade had already taken steps aimed at better managing the use of ``BA teams'' by requiring control points and control boards to track firefighters entering a hazardous environment.

One account of the disaster said the control board at the Smithfield helped the fire brigade determine two firefighters were missing, but another account said the control board wasn't set up when Fort-Wells and Stocking entered the market.

In February 1958 - ``due to the outcry over the recent deaths of firemen'' - the British Home Office establsihed a Committee of Inquiry into the operational use of breathing apparatus, according to an artile entitled ``The History of BA in the British Fire Services" and published on the Fire Net International web site.

By June, the committee had developed a new set of procedures and asked 12 fire brigades to participate in a trial program.

In October, the government issued ``Fire Service Circular No. 37/1958'' detailing the findings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommending, among orther things, that all British fire brigades establish control procedures for recording and supervising breathing apparatus wearers as well as standard procedures for firefighters wearing breathing apparatus.

Over the decades, the procedures - as well as the breathing apparatus - have evolved to offer a greater margin of safety in a very dangerous business.

John Bishop, the acting station officer at Whitefriers Station, was among those to arrive at the market shortly after the engine from the Clerkenwell Station, and he said: ``There was no sign of flames, just lots of smoke, but conditions were getting worse.''

Bishop's account of the tragedy - obtained from an October 1999 article based on a Channel 4 television series and Gavin Weightman's book "RESCUE - The History of Britain's Emergency Services" - follows:

"It was a maze and we used clapping signals. I was going down the center and I'd send men down a passageway here and there. You would walk along one step at a time, with the back of your hand in front of you in case you walked into something red-hot, making sure you were not going to fall down a hole. All we could find was passageways with meat packed either side from floor to ceiling. The smoke got thicker - you could eat it; black oily smoke. It was very cold down there and you were cold, even though you were sweating. That was fear."

A special service was held Jan. 23, 2008 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the fire.

Deputy Commissioner of London Fire Brigade Roy Bishop, Superintendent of the Smithfield Market Robert Wilson and Smithfield Market Tenants’ Association Deputy Chairman, Mark Twogood laid wreaths the City of London Corporation’s Smithfield Market. Other members of the Brigade joined traders and workers, including those who witnessed the fire - which raged for four days.

Deputy Commissioner Bishop said: “This is a landmark fire in the history of London and its fire brigade. It is important that we remember this tragic fire and honour the memory of the two London firefighters who lost their lives.”

Tenants’ Association Deputy Chairman Twogood said: “The dedication shown by all those firemen involved in fighting the fire in this Market in 1958 epitomises the service which Londoners know the Fire Brigade is ready to deliver every day.”

Four years earlier, Clerkenwell firefighters paid dearly at a fire at Covent Garden on May 11, 1954.

``While fighting a fire in a warehouse containing fruit and vegetables, adjacent to Covent Garden, London, Station Officer Fred Hawkins and Fireman A E J Batt-Rawden, both of Clerkenwell Fire Station, lost their lives,'' according to Fire magazine. ``Sub Officer Sidney Peen, Leading Fireman Ernest Datlin, Fireman Kenneth Aylward, Fireman Charles Gadd, Fireman Frederick Parr and Fireman Daniel Stocking were all sent to hospital. Three of the injured required plastic surgery treatment.''

_____


INCIDENT LOG

The comprehensive blog "Tales and Stories of the London Fire Brigade and its people" features an excellent account of the Smithfield Market fire, an excerpt of which is presented here - the incident log:

0218 Call to the Union Cold Store-Smithfield Street.

B20 (Clerkenwell) PE. P. ET

B36 (Whitefriars) P

B35 (Cannon Street) TL

0230. From Station Officer Fourt-Wells. Make pump four.

B36 (Whitefriars) PE and B33 (Redcross Street) P plus A4 (Euston) AFS Pump ordered. ADO Lloyd and DO Shawyer attending from B Div HQ (Clerkenwell)

O246. From DO Shawyer. Considerable amount of smoke issuing from basement store, market section. No fire yet. BA men searching.

0253. From DO Shawyer. Second ET required to stand-by.    D61 (Lambeth) ET ordered.

0255. From DO Shawyer. A building of 2 floors and basement, about 300 ft x 300 ft, part of basement alight.

0307. Ex Tele call to Lambeth Control. Fire Charterhouse Street. (DO Shawyer informed.)

0315. From DO Shawyer. Making an entrance at Charterhouse Street. 

0318. From DO Shawyer. Making entry from two different sides of the fire. Smithfield Street and Charterhouse Street. The fire has not yet been located. 4 additional pumps with BA required to stand-by. A4 (Euston) P from Clerkenwell. B32 (Bishopsgate) P from Whitefriars. B27 (Shoreditch) P and D62 (Southwark) P.

0325. From DO Shawyer. Fire located on Charterhouse Street side of incident.

0342. From ACO Cunningham at Smithfield Street make pumps 8.

A1 (Manchester Square) P from Clerkenwell. D64 (Old Kent Road) P from Whitefriars. B33 (Redcross Street) PE. B35 (Cannon Street) PE.  Brig HQ (Lambeth) CU. A1 (Manchester Square) HLL.

0347. From ACO Cunningham. 3 emergency lights required. Extent of fire still not known, access being made from all available points.

Deputy Chief Leete mobile to incident.

0356. CU arrived and in control. (R/T 20)

0408. From ACO Cunningham. Make pumps 12.

B37 (Holloway) P from Redcross Street. A10 (Kensington) from Clerkenwell. B29 (Burdett Road) from Whitefriars. D66 (Brixton) P from Cannon Street. (*On the make pumps 12; 4 PEs, 13 Ps plus 1 AFS pump would be in attendance.)

0433. From Chief Officer. Order CaV at once with refreshments for 100 men. (D61 Lambeth CaV ordered.)

0448. From Chief Officer. Second ambulance required at Smithfield Market.

0459. From Chief Officer. 10 BA pumps required as relief at 0600hrs.

(B21 Islington, B24 Homerton, B26 Bethnal Green, B31 Shadwell, C42 Deptford, C43 East Greenwich, C50 Lewisham, D63 Dockhead, D60 Clapham, A3 Camden Town.)

0500. From Chief Officer. Make ambulances 4.

0507. From the Chief Officer. Fm Stropp removed to hospital.

0514. From the Chief Officer Station Officer Fourt–Wells and Fireman Stocking (B20) overcome by smoke and removed to hospital by ambulance.

KINGS CROSS FIRE - 1987

Station Officer Colin Townsley lost his life at King's Cross  

Photos: Euston Fire Station, BBC web sites

"MAKE PUMPS THIRTY... AT LEAST 50 PERSONS BELIEVED INVOLVED...CREWS STILL SEARCHING" - Radio Message

By Vinny Del Giudice
London Fire Journal

On Nov. 18, 1987, a flash fire engulfed an old wooden escalator at the King's Cross underground station. Thirty-one people perished in that disaster including a firefighter - Colin Townsley, station officer from the Soho Fire Station in central London. Two other firefighters were trapped on the station platform - at the bottom of the escalator - but survived.

``The thick hanging smell of the fire lingered in the tube station passageways for months afterwards,'' commuter Andrew Pryde told the BBC.

A discarded match apparently ignited grease and rubbish in a machine room beneath escalator serving the Picadilly Line, even though smoking was banned on the London Underground after a fire at the Oxford Circus station a few years earlier.

``I remember the machine rooms under the escalators throughout the Underground system before the fire used to be disgusting places covered in oil and grime,'' electrician Karl Hoskin told the BBC. ``But within a very short space of time after the fire they became so clean you could have almost eaten your dinner from the floor!''

Townsley and his crew from Soho were first due at King's Cross that night followed by the crew at the Clerkenwell station. Firefighters from the nearby Euston fire station were at another alarm at University College Hospital. Soon thereafter, the Soho firefighters radioed for assistance - “Make Pumps Four Persons Reported” and Euston responded.

The fire escalated to a ``30 pump'' incident - equivalent to a ``general alarm'' in the U.S.

Investigator's report

Paul Grimwood, who was a fire investigator with the London Fire Brigade at the time, provided the following report to the web site Fire Tactics:

Kings Cross underground station is one of the busiest on London's 'tube' railway network serving over 100,000 passengers during peak hours. At approximately 7.32 pm on the evening of the fire, smoke was seen coming from one of the wooden escalators that was transporting passengers up from the platform levels to the ticketing hall.

The London Fire Brigade dispatched 4 engines and an aerial ladder as the call was received at 7.36 pm and the first of these arrived on scene at 7.42pm. A team of firefighters went down from street level into the ticketing hall from where they could see a fire burning about 20 feet down the escalator shaft with four feet high flames emerging from the escalator stairs. At this stage there were still passengers exiting from the platforms below in an orderly manner.

As firefighters returned to street level to collect hose and breathing apparatus three officers remained in the ticketing hall to supervise the evacuation of passengers. Whilst two of them began a descent down towards the platforms to prevent further use of this escalator as an exit route, the senior officer - Station Officer Colin Townsley - remained in the ticketing hall at the top of the escalator shaft.

Flames explode

More from Grimwood:

At 7.45pm the fire suddenly erupted up into the ticketing hall and created severe conditions likened to that of a flashover. At street level thick volumes of black smoke began to emerge from the station entrances and a large number of screaming passengers exited into the street. The fire burned for several hours killing 31 people including Soho's Station Officer Colin Townsley who died trying to rescue a woman from the blazing ticketing hall as the fire suddenly erupted.

Firefighters attempting to re-enter the ticketing hall to fight the fire likened the conditions as similar to climbing down into a volcano.

Various theories were put forward as to what caused the ' flashover like' conditions as the fire suddenly erupted into the ticketing hall. In terms of scientific definition the event did not conform to the universal acceptance of what constitutes a 'flashover'. Consideration was given to the possibilty of an ignition of fire gases that may have accumulated within the ticketing hall where such an event would be more closely accepted in definition to that of a 'backdraft'.

Further thought was directed at the likelihood of the escalator fire being pushed upwards in the shaft by a 'piston effect' as trains arriving at platforms forced a major airflow out of the tunnels and up into the ticketing hall. However, mathematical modeling and computer simulations promoted a new theory of rapid fire development within inclined shafts with combustible surfaces termed trench effect.

It was established that once the trench effect became established, the 'piston effect' from trains would not have played an important role in the rapid spread of the fire up the escalator and into the ticketing hall. This trench effect was seen to cause hot gases in the buoyant plume to lay along the escalator surface and create a rapid airflow which caused these gases to curl over and over towards the next steps above. The airflows in the trench increased in proportion to the size of the fire, eventually creating a flamethrower type effect up and into the ticketing hall.

However, it is certain that a large quantity of unburned combustion products (pyrolyzates) existed in the smoke and fire gases forming at ceiling level in the booking hall at the head of the escalator as the fire reached this stage of rapid fire progress. It is also apparent, from firefighters accounts, that the piston effect did play a major part at various stages of the fire's development in creating a more intense fire as trains passed through the station tunnels some levels below the escalator itself.

The cause of the fire was discovered by London Fire Brigade investigators to have resulted from the most likely discardment of a lighted match (smoker's material) by a passenger on exit from the system and strong evidence existed that demonstrated several smaller fires of this type had occurred in the past on this escalator but never progressed beyond a small self extinguishing fire that probably went unnoticed. Subsequent tests confirmed the likelihood of such a fire being able to develop beyond a stage of self extinguishment when located in the grease track that existed under the escalator. There had also been several small fires on other underground stations in London that involved wooden escalators.

Although the evidence was heavily weighted towards the careless discardment of a lighted smoker's match as a cause of the fire there had been reports of an earlier incident in the evening on an adjacent escalator in a nearby shaft that raised the question as to whether the Kings Cross fire could have been caused maliciously. There had been several accounts by witnesses who described a small fire existing at the base of an escalator in the Victoria line shaft just minutes before the reported fire in the Piccadilly line shaft that progressed into a major conflagration.

This smaller fire involved an item of burning paper that appeared to have been rolled up and thrown down the shaft from or near the top of the escalator.

Fennell Investigation

The fire led to new safety regulations, according to the online encyclopedia Wikipedia:

The Fennell Investigation into the fire prompted the introduction of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 (usually referred to as the Section 12 Regulations because they were introduced under section 12 of the 1971 Fire Precautions Act). These led to: the replacement of all wooden escalators on the Underground; the mandatory installation of automatic sprinklers and heat detectors in escalators; mandatory fire safety training for all station staff twice a year; and improvements in emergency services liaison.

Sadly, tragedy visited the underground station again in the terrorist attack on London on July 7, 2005. A bomb exploded on a train in the tunnel between King's Cross and Russell Square. The London Fire Brigade rescued victims trapped below.

LONDON SALVAGE CORPS

UPDATED AUGUST 2019

Photo: Commercial Motor magazine

Until April 1984, London's insurance companies maintained their own private fire service - the London Salvage Corps - to protect buildings and goods from fire, smoke and water. While the corpsmen risked their lives just like the city's firefighters, the service was rocked by an arson scandal in the 1930s.

According to the Feb. 26, 1934 edition of Time magazine:

``At all great London fires for the past ten years, Londoners have seen inside the fire lines a tall, hearty figure in the black helmet and blue uniform of the Salvage Corps. He was Captain Brymore Eric Miles, chief of the insurance companies' special force to keep down unnecessary damage by fire & water. On his hefty chest glittered a row of medals, including the Military Cross and the Stars of Mons.

``How venal a heart those medals covered Londoners first discovered last November, at the end of a scandalous trial of a huge arson ring. Before he was sentenced to 14 years in jail, the ringleader, one Leopold Harris, testified that he had had nearly every Salvage Corps officer in his pocket. Of the ring's £500,000 annual takings in insurance, Captain Miles had received a paltry £25 a month for overlooking cases of suspected arson.

``Last week a jury in Old Bailey Court found brave Captain Miles guilty of `corruption and conspiring to pervert the administration of justice.' Grimly the judge sentenced him to four years in jail."

Overview

Besides London, insurance companies operated salvage corps in Liverpool and Glasgow in the United Lingdom, as well as major U.S. cities from New York to San Francisco. None are left. The New York Fire Patrol disbanded in 2006. One of the remaining salvage corps is in Asia. The Loss Prevention Association of India operates in Mumbai. The unit is stationed at Cotton Green and is ``on the hot line of the Bombay Fire Brigade,'' according to the association's web site.

According to the web site of the Houston (Texas) Fire Museum:

Regular firefighters jokingly referred to patrolmen as "diaper boys" because of the large tarpaulins. Patrolmen, however, entered burning buildings along with the firefighters and experienced their share of serious injuries and death. Salvage Corps usually rode with more men than rode on fire apparatus. There were fire patrols running with upwards of ten patrolmen.

Operations of London corps

The 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, published in 1911, featured an article on the London service. According to an online reprint:

The London Salvage Corps is maintained by the fire offices of London. The corps was first formed in 1865 and began operations in March 1866. The staff of the corps when first formed consisted of 64. Since that time, owing to the many improvements that have taken place in the system of dealing with salvage, and the increase in the work to be done, the corps has necessarily been strengthened, and the staff now numbers over 100. The various stations of the corps are well placed, and the Metropolis has been mapped out so that when a fire takes place it may be attended to at the earliest possible moment.

The headquarters are situated at Watling Street, which is called the No. I station, and this station protects the City of London enclosed by the Euston Road, Tottenham Court Road, City Road and the river Thames; this is known as the B district. No. 2 station is at Commercial Road, and attends to the whole of the E. and N.E. portion of London to the N. of the Thames, and is known as the C district. No. 3 station, opposite the headquarters of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade Station in the Southwark Bridge Road, protects the whole of S. London, and is known as the D district. No. 4 station, at Shaftesbury Avenue, is called the A district, and covers the West End and Kensington. Finally, No. 5 station, in Upper Street, Islington, guards the parish of Islington.

The working staff, which is mainly recruited from the royal navy, consists of the chief officer and a superintendent, foreman and crew of men at each station. The stations of the corps are connected by telephone with the fire brigade stations from whence the calls are received. In addition to the home staff, there is also a staff constantly employed during the daytime in inspecting docks, wharves, Manchester goods and uptown warehouses, and reports are made weekly to the committee.

Duties of the corps

The encyclopdeia also said:

Generally speaking, the work of the Corps may be divided into two distinct classes (1) services at fires; (2) watching and working salvage.

(1) Services at Fires form the most important feature of the work. Much depends upon the method of dealing with the salvage. If, for instance, a large Manchester goods warehouse was on fire in the top part, it would be very little advantage to the offices interested in the risk if the men were set to work removing the stock off the ground floor. The best method would be to cover up with tarpaulin all goods there, and prevent the water from collectingon the lower floors. It will be gathered that the most important work of the corps is to prevent damage to goods, and that water is mostly looked after. The damage from fire is left almost entirely to the fire brigade.

The traps, which immediately on receipt of an alarm proceed to the scene of the fire with their crew of men, carry every kind of appliance for the saving of goods from destruction by fire or damage by water, as well as lime-light apparatus for use in working after the fire has been extinguished, thus enabling the men to note the position of dangerous walls, &c.; and a portable coal-gas apparatus, which can be employed in the interior of buildings when the ordinary means of ifiumination has failed; in addition to ambulance appliances for emergencies.

(2) Working Salvage.When a fire takes place, a man is left behind in charge of the salvage if the property is insured; or if that fact cannot be ascertained, but it appears probable that it is, a man is left until the information is obtained later. The duty, if an important one, is divided into a day and night duty. This enables an experienced man to be sent on day duty to meet the surveyor, and to carry out his instructions regarding the working out of the salvage; and a junior man at night. The day man, if working out salvage, would employ a number of men called strangers, over whom he acts as a kind of foreman.

The working out may take the form of dividing up damaged goods into lots ready for a sale to be held by the surveyor, or of sifting over the debris to find remains of certain articles claimed for. If, for instance, a large fire occurred at a pianoforte manufacturers, and the debris was all in one common heap, the London Salvage Corps might have to arrange certain quantities of pegs and wires in order to give an idea of the number of pianos before the fire. The watching continues until the loss is settled, when the charge of the premises is given over to the assured.

FIRE ALARM SYSTEM

(Photos: Bob's Telephone Files web site)

British firefighters call fire alarms ``Shouts.'' That probably goes back to the days when peopled shouted ``Fire! Fire!'' to bring out the brigade. In the 19th century and early 20th century, the fire alarm telegraph was introduced in London and other cities worldwide.

As technology advanced, ``corner call box'' systems became obsolete to be replaced by today's emergency telephone lines such as 999 in the United Kingdom and 911 in the U.S.

In January 1938, Volume 30 of the Post Office Electrical Engineer's Journal discussed the ``modernization'' of London's fire telegraph alarm system in the years leading up to World War II. The article, written by C.H. Wright, explained the evolution of the alarm system - and also provided a glimpse at pre-war LFB operations.

Excerpts follow:

Introduction

The ceremonial opening of the new Fire Brigade Headquarters, Albert Embankment, by His Majesty the King on July 21st 1937 marked the completion of the initial stage in the London County Council's programme to provide London with an up-to-date fire alarm system. For the past 37 years or so London has been protected by the "Brown" fire alarm system which has been rented by the Council from the Postmaster General. This system, which was invented by the late A. C. Brown, is the acme of simplicity and has faithfully fulfilled its purposes.

In the "Brown" system each street post is connected by a direct pair to a common battery at the station via a flap indicator. When a point is "pulled" the line circuit is closed, causing the flap of the indicator to fall, exposing its designation and a line jack, and actuating the station alarm bell. The contact is kept closed by an electromagnet within the head, until released by the watchroom attendant plugging into the line jack and disconnecting the line current. Each street point is also equipped with a buzzer which produces a distinctive signal when the point is pulled enabling the attendant to distinguish between genuine and false calls.

In 1913 as the result of an unfortunate fatality the Brigade intimated that they had ceased to place reliance in the buzzer signal and from that date they have turned out for any and every indication what so ever.

In 1900 there were 675 posts. They had increased to 1,300 in 1928 and 1,732 in 1936. The number of calls received in 1936 was 9,297. Of these, 5,875 were genuine and 3,422 false. The false calls were divided between 1,304 malicious calls, and 2,118 calls due to electrical defects and other causes. Of the latter figure approximately 1,000 were attributed to electrical faults.
It was with a view to reducing the number of abortive turnouts and the annual costs to the Brigade in rentals that in 1928 the Council approached the Post Office to aid them in providing their own system and the Post Office readily agreed to place its experience at the disposal of the Council.

Following protracted cost studies the Council decided to accept the Gamewell, code signalling, closed circuit, system which was considered to be the most satisfactory, and an experimental system of 26 street boxes arranged on two loops, was provided and installed in 1931 by Messrs. Standard Telephones & Cables, Ltd., at the late Headquarters station in Southwark. The Post Office conducted the negotiations and the placing of the contract, supervised the installation and the acceptance of the equipment, and recovered the cost, which included a nominal percentage service charge, from the Council under a repayment order. The line wires were of course rented from the Post Office which also undertook the maintenance of the equipment on rental terms. The system functioned satisfactorily and in 1936 the Council decided to proceed with the conversion programme commencing with the new Headquarters Station at Lambeth, to be followed by the "B" District. They expressed a wish, however, for certain later developments which were covered by patents associated with the apparatus manufactured by Messrs. Automatic Telephone & Electric Co., Ltd., to be incorporated in the street boxes. The contractors were approached and by agreement with the Council it was decided to accept street boxes of Messrs. Automatic Telephone & Electric Co.'s design and station equipment designed by Messrs. Standard Telephones & Cables. This has resulted in a division of the work between the two contractors.

Work has been completed in the "B" District and the equipment was brought into use in November. There are ten stations including Clerkenwell, which is the superintendent station, and 299 street boxes. Messrs. Standard Telephones & Cables are installing the equipment at Whitefriars, Cannon Street, Redcross Street, Soho and Holloway, and Messrs. Automatic Telephones and Electric Co. have Clerkenwell, Euston, Islington, Camden Town and Kentish Town in hand.

Instructions have also been received to proceed with the installations for Battersea and Shadwell new fire stations.

Organisation of the London Fire Brigade

The L.C.C. area is divided into six districts A-F, each in charge of a superintendent station which controls the outstations in the respective districts. The superintendent stations are Manchester Square, Clerkenwell, Whitechapel, New Cross, Southwark and Clapham. The station at the Fire Brigade Headquarters is an outstation on Southwark.

There are 52 outstations and each has a direct telephone line to its superintendent station, each of which has in turn direct communication with the control room at headquarters, Lambeth. Each superintendent station has a direct line numbered 2222 to every telephone exchange in its district. Outstations have no direct exchange line, so that fire calls originated by the public over the telephone exchange network must necessarily be advised to the superintendent station. The alarm is then transmitted to the outstation concerned from the superintendent station by a fire signal over the direct telephone line, which rings the station alarm bells. While the firemen are manning the appliances ready to depart, the watchroom attendant ascertains the particulars of the fire and passes them to the station officer who rides on the first appliance to leave.

An indicator at the superintendent station associated with the fire signal key is operated and remains in view until it is restored manually upon receipt of the advice from the outstation that the appliance has returned.

If a call is received at an outstation from one of its street points the watchroom attendant transmits a fire signal to the superintendent station, which rings a local alarm bell only, and passes over details of the call. The indicator signifying "appliance out" is again operated and remains so until the appliance returns. The superintendent thus knows at any time the disposition of the fire fighting appliances in his area.

The Brigade is organised so that as some stations are deprived of their apparatus in response to calls others are re-distributed to cover those stations. Particulars of all fires and the appliances attending them are notified to headquarters where a mobilisation map is marked to show the seat of the fires and the appliances attending.

Fires which are beyond the capacity of an outstation to deal with become district calls upon which the district appliances are concentrated. If these cannot gain control over the conflagration a brigade call is circulated and appliances are drawn from the stations throughout the London area under the direction of the Mobilisation Officer at headquarters. This may mean as many as 60 pumps, escapes, etc., being employed. The remaining appliances are re-distributed over the area.

The present equipment of the Brigade includes 68 pumps, 55 dual purpose appliances (escape and pumps), 35 escape vans and turntable ladders, 26 other appliances and 3 river floats. There are 31,311 fire hydrants and 52 miles of hose. The personnel comprises 1,980 uniform staff and 163 administrative, technical and other ranks.

The `Gamewell' System

Since its introduction into this country in 1900, the Gamewell System of Fire Alarms has remained basically unchanged. The street fire alarm boxes differ in detail, but the modifications which have been introduced from time to time by the various manufacturers have all been in the nature of refinements, or added facilities. The fundamental principles of the system are as follows :-

1. It is a closed circuit system. The diagram shows the electrical circuit in its simplest form.

2. The street fire alarm boxes are arranged in groups. The boxes forming a group, maximum 20, are connected in series by a single wire which passes progressively from one box to the next.

3. A small current of 50 milliamps is maintained around the loop by a battery at the fire station. The maximum permissible voltage of the battery is 50 volts.

4. Each box contains a powerful clockwork mechanism which is employed to drive a code wheel which transmits signals to the fire station.

5. The various electromagnets in the recording equipment at the station are employed to release the energy of coiled springs.

6. Each box bears a code number of two, three, or four digits. The highest digit is 6.

7. Normally, the mechanism of each box is short- circuited by contacts held closed within the box.

8. When a box is "pulled" it commences to send its code after a short test interval. Impulse contacts in series with the line are intermittently made and broken in accordance with the code number of the box. A box coded 214 would transmit two impulses, followed by one and then by four. Between digits the circuit is disconnected.

9. The code number is sent three times, whereupon the mechanism stops and the short-circuit is restored. The signals are transmitted at a speed of 3 impulses per second.

10. Suitable apparatus is located at the fire station which gives visible and audible indication of the call.

11. A disconnection on the line due to a fault is recorded on the station apparatus and a " patching" switch is operated automatically, which earths the station battery and connects both ends of the fire loop bunched, to the recording apparatus. The system resorts temporarily to earth working.

12. The use of code signalling prevents a fault from being mistaken for a genuine call.

13. Calls can be received without loss of impulses under anyone of the following fault conditions:-
Circuit brokenCircuit broken and earthed at the same pointBox or boxes short-circuitedCircuit earthing

14. Calls incoming from the Gamewell loops can be automatically repeated to a central or superintendent station over a repeat loop.

15. Two types of alarm boxes are used.

(a) Plain Sector.
(b) Non-interference Succession.

The plain Sector box is employed on small installations where the possibility is remote of two boxes on the same loop being pulled simultaneously. On large installations this condition is more likely to arise, and from a consideration of the diagram above, it will be seen that if a second box is pulled while one is already transmitting, they world interrupt each other's signals and the record at the station would be unintelligible.

To prevent this, the succession box was introduced. With this type more than one box can be pulled simultaneously on the same loop without interference. The succession feature causes each box to await its turn to transmit its code, the order of succession being controlled strictly in accordance with the chronological order in which the boxes were pulled. When a box is once "pulled" further operation of the handle cannot affect the working of the mechanism, until it has transmitted its code and reset itself.